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WISCONSIN SHOULD ADOPT THE
DEATH PENALTY
JOHN C. MCADAMS*
Most Americans think the death penalty is appropriate for those who
commit the most heinous crimes. Since 1985, Gallup (to cite only a
single example) has consistently found seventy percent or more of the
American population favoring capital punishment.' In Wisconsin, the
state legislature has under consideration a bill that would provide for
possible execution of persons guilty of first-degree intentional homicide
of anyone who is younger than sixteen years old. This is a very modest
and limited death penalty bill, yet it is controversial.
Should Wisconsin follow the path of other states that allow execu-
tions? Is the support of the majority of Americans-and the majority of
American states-just a barbaric prejudice of some sort, or does this
overwhelming majority have good reasons for believing as it does? In
this case, the voice of the people is, if not the voice of God, at least the
voice of sound moral judgment and practical reason.
The reasons to favor the death penalty are numerous.
COST
In principle, it is much cheaper to execute prisoners than to lock
them up for life, or even for twenty or thirty year prison sentences. In
1990, for example, the average yearly cost to keep an offender in prison
was $15,496.2 So it is deeply ironic that death penalty opponents argue
that it is cheaper to incarcerate a prisoner for life than to execute him.
But they are correct. As Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam put it:
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1. Alec Gallup & Dr. Frank Newport, Death Penalty Support Remains Strong, THE
GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, June 1991, at 43.
2. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 13 (1992).
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A criminal justice system (like Michigan's or Canada's) that never
raises the controversial question of the death penalty in a murder
case is far less expensive to operate than a system (like Califor-
nia's or Texas's) that regularly raises the issue in every case of
aggravated murder.3
But why is this? Because death penalty opponents-or more
properly activist lawyers among them-prevent timely executions and
impose great costs on prosecutors with virtually endless appeals! In
1988, for example, former Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell, Jr.
reported that in Georgia the time between the commission of a murder
and the execution of the murderer averaged close to ten years.4 This
situation reminds me of the famous (and doubtless apocryphal) case in
the English courts where a young man was accused of a horrible crime:
killing both of his parents. He threw himself on the mercy of the court,
asking for leniency because he was an orphan!5 Thus opponents of
capital punishment, having vastly inflated the cost of executing murder-
ers, argue that it is cheaper not to do so.
Realizing any cost saving through capital punishment requires
instituting reforms similar to those proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee
on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, which was chaired by
Justice Powell. That committee concluded that capital cases "should be
subject to one fair and complete course of collateral review in the state
and federal system, free from time pressure of impending execution and
with the assistance of competent counsel."6 Death penalty opponents
have fussed and fumed that such proposals "shortcut" the civil rights of
the prisoner.7 However, they have not bothered to explain how there
is a "civil right" to file appeal after appeal.
DETERRENCE
Death penalty opponents will often flatly state that the evidence
shows that executions do not deter murder. The logic of such claims
about the evidence is usually questionable at best. For example, death
3. MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE 277 (1992).
4. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Commentary: Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1038
(1989).
5. This story must be apocryphal since it supposedly took place in an English court. Had
it supposedly taken place in California, I would have seriously entertained the possibility that
it really happened.
6. Ad Hoc Comm. on Fed. Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, Report on Habeas Corpus
in Capital Cases, 45 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3239, 3240 (Sept. 27, 1989).
7. Stephen Reinhardt, Must We Rush the Executioner? L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1989, at B7.
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penalty opponents will claim that murderers act in a fit of rage, utterly
out of control, and oblivious to the consequences of their act. Clarence
Darrow, for example, argued:
Quarrels between husbands and wives, disappointed love, or love
too much requited cause many killings. They are the result of
primal emotions so deep that the fear of death has not the
slightest effect in preventing them. Spontaneous feelings overflow
in criminal acts, and consequences do not count. Then there are
cases of sudden anger, uncontrollable rage. The fear of death
never enters into such cases: if the anger is strong enough,
consequences are not considered until too late.8
One problem with this argument is that even if it is true of some
murderers, it may well be untrue of others. And deterring those
"others" may be quite worthwhile.
But even leaving that aside, this sort of claim about people being
oblivious to consequences is mere supposition. At least equally plausible
is the observation of Harvard psychologist Richard Hernstein: "when
your wife gets mad and starts throwing dishes, she always throws the
cheap stuff, she never throws the good china." Readers might ask
themselves how they would act if enraged by a comment from their boss.
Would they necessarily attack, or at least verbally "tell off" the boss?
Or would their probability of doing that depend heavily on the boss'
expected reaction, how much they like the job and fear losing it, and
what protections they have (Civil Service, union, etc.) that might allow
them to anger the boss with impunity?
However, speculation on this issue-even plausible speculation-is
less convincing than hard evidence. And the evidence is that crimes of
"passion" and crimes committed by "enraged" people can be deterred.
The evidence is clear, for example, that assaults can be deterred by the
certainty and severity of punishment.' Conceptually, assault is very
similar to murder. A murder can be viewed as a particularly vio-
lent-and competently executed-assault. If the likelihood of punish-
ment can deter an enraged person who wishes to beat or bludgeon
8. Clarence Darrow, The Futility of the Death Penalty, 80 THE FORUM 327,328-29 (Sept.
1928).
9. Isaac Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical
Investigation, 81 J. POL. ECON. 521 (1973). Ehrlich notes that "the estimated elasticities [i.e.,
deterrent effect of punishment] of crimes against the person with respect to probability and
severity of punishment are not lower on the average than those associated with crimes against
property." Id. at 552. This, of course, is not what we would expect if we believe crimes
against property are based on calculating self-interest, while crimes against persons are crimes
of "hate and passion" and cannot be deterred.
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someone, it is hard to see how a would-be murderer would react
differently. And indeed, evidence clearly indicates that punishment
deters murders.'0 Note that I said "punishment," rather than "capital
punishment." The evidence on capital punishment specifically will be
discussed shortly. For now, the key point is that the probabilities of
arrest, conviction, and imprisonment clearly act to deter murders. Thus
people's behavior-even the behavior of "enraged" people-is affected
by the likely consequences that may follow from their acts."
When death penalty opponents move beyond generic models of
human behavior to examine crime statistics, their arguments only barely
improve. They will point out, for example, that Texas has the death
penalty while Wisconsin does not, yet Wisconsin has fewer murders than
Texas. This argument ignores the fact that different states have different
cultures, people with different backgrounds, and would have vastly
different murder rates regardless of anything the criminal justice system
does. It is likely that the same Texas culture, heavily influenced by the
Old West, renders Texans more accepting of the death penalty, more
likely to carry weapons, and more likely to settle arguments with
violence. It is vastly implausible speculation to say that abolishing the
death penalty in Texas would reduce the murder rate there to the level
that prevails in Wisconsin.
The argument from raw murder rates also ignores- the fact that a high
incidence of murder is likely to create the political demand for the death
penalty. If Wisconsin had the murder rate of Texas, Wisconsin voters
would likely have long ago insisted that the state execute murderers.
10. See Theodore Black & Thomas Orsagh, New Evidence on the Efficacy of Sanctions
as a Deterrent to Homicide, 58 Soc. SCI. Q. 616 (1978); Ruth D. Peterson & William C.
Bailey, Felony Murder and Capital Punishment: An Examination of the Deterrence Question,
29 CRIMINOLOGY 367 (1991); William C. Bailey, A Multivariate Cross-Sectional Analysis of the
Deterrence Effect of the Death Penalty. 64 Soc. & SOC. RES. 183 (1980); Brian E. Frost, The
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Cross-State Analysis of the 1960s, 61 MINN. L. REV.
743 (1977); Brian E. Frost, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Conflicting Evidence?, 74 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 927 (1983) (hereinafter Frost, Capital Punishment); Jack Gibbs,
Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence, 48 Sw. Soc. SC. Q. 515 (1968); See also infra note 19 for
studies that show not only that punishment deters murder, but that capital punishment deters
murder.
11. As Luksetich and White point out, much of the evidence that murder can be
deterred was produced by scholars who challenged Ehrlich's pioneer study supporting the
deterrent effect of the death penalty. "Almost without exception, the findings of these studies
indicate that the probability of apprehension and conviction and the severity of punishment
(length of imprisonment) have a statistically significant, negative relationship with homicide
rates." WILLIAM A. LUKSETICH & MICHAEL D. WHITE, CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN
ECONOMIC APPROACH 109 (1982).
[Voi.79:707
ADOPT THE DEATH PENALTY
The next, only slightly more sophisticated, kind of analysis compares
pairs of states: on the one hand states that have the death penalty, and
on the other states that do not have the death penalty. Thorsten Sellin
is famous for this sort of study, and he invariably finds no difference in
homicide rates between "abolitionist" states and states that have capital
punishment. The problems with this sort of analysis are numerous. In
the first place, merely having the death penalty on the books is unlikely
to be a deterrent if it is seldom enforced. Yet in several of Sellin's
"abolitionist" states, executions were extremely rare or nonexistent in the
years he studied. 2 Further, this sort of analysis is entirely dependent
on the comparability of the pairs of states chosen. Sellin attempted to
insure comparability by using geographically adjacent states. For
example, he compared the murder rate in Massachusetts and Connecticut
(which had the death penalty) with that in Rhode Island (which did not).
Likewise, he compared the murder rate in Minnesota and Wisconsin (no
death penalty) with that in Iowa (a death penalty state). 3 It is obvious-
ly questionable to suggest that these states are "comparable," and would
be expected to have identical murder rates except for any differences
that resulted from the existence of the death penalty.
What of more methodologically sophisticated studies? Not all are
necessarily of much use. One body of literature, for example, looks at
the murder rate in the days and weeks following highly publicized
executions. Some of these studies merely look at executions, but others
look at the publicity that surrounds executions. The deterrence
hypothesis holds that murders should decline after an execution. And
indeed some studies show this, 4 but others show no such effect," and
still others show a "brutalization" effect, with murder rates actually
increasing after a publicized execution. 6
The problem with any study of this sort is that it makes some rather
peculiar assumptions about the psychology and decision-making
processes of potential murderers. It assumes that they periodically forget
12. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 182 (Vintage Books, rev. ed. 1985).
13. Thorsten Sellin, Capital Punishment, 25 FED. PROBATION 3 (Sept. 1961). See also
THORSTEN SELLIN, THE PENALTY OF DEATH (1980).
14. David P. Phillips, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: New Evidence on an
Old Controversy, 86 AM. J. Soc. 139 (1989).
15. Sam G. McFarland, Is Capital Punishment a Short-Term Deterrent to Homicide?, 74
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1014 (1983); Peterson & Bailey, supra note 10; Jeffrey Grogger,
The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment An Analysis of Daily Homicide Counts, 85 J. AM.
STAT. ASS'N 295 (1990).
16. William Bowers & Glenn Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: What is the Effect of
Executions?, 26 CRIME & DELIQ. 453 (1980).
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that a murder conviction in their state can lead to execution. When they
forget, they revert to thinking murderers are never executed-until
another well-publicized execution reminds them of the reality.
It is not impossible that at least some people reason this way, and
thus it is not ridiculous to look for such effects. But it is more likely that
most people walk around with an abiding knowledge of what public
policy is with regard to murder. A rational individual will understand
that the lack of any recent execution does not mean that murder carries
no risk of execution. A rational individual will probably not confuse the
publicity that accompanies executions in celebrated cases with the actual
likelihood of his being executed if convicted of murder. A high rate of
executions can result in only a moderate amount of publicity, while the
execution of a notorious murderer can cause a huge brouhaha. The
execution in Illinois of John Wayne Gacy comes to mind.
In this context, searching for week-to-week variations in the murder
rate seems a lot like producing a statistical model of the waves on the
ocean. Such a model would tell us nothing about the depth of the water
under the waves. It's worth noting, for example, that Cover and
Thistle 7 found that year-to-year variations in the number of executions
failed to explain murder rates, while a three-year moving average of the
number of executions did indeed show the expected deterrent effect.
Apparently, potential murderers take a reasonably long-term view, and
know that a lack of recent executions does not necessarily demonstrate
that the system has become unwilling to impose capital punishment.
To criticize poorly done studies, or to show that certain studies may
fail to pick up real, important deterrent effects is not to say that a more
sophisticated analysis always shows that capital punishment deters
murder. Of the very best studies, some have failed to show a deterrent
effect,"8 but others, from scholars such as Isaac Ehrlich, James Yunker,
Kenneth Wolpin, Cover and Thistle, David Lester, Stephen K. Layson,
and Dale Cloninger, have demonstrated a deterrent effect. 9
17. James Perry Cover & Paul D. Thistle. Time Series, Homicide, and the Deterrent Effect
of Capital Punishment, 54 S. ECON. J. 615 (1988).
18. Black & Orsagh. supra note 10; Frost, Capital Punishment, supra note 10. See also
studies, supra note 10, all of which, while showing that punishment deters murder, fail to show
that capital punishment provides greater deterrence than imprisonment.
19. Cover & Thistle, supra note 17; David Lester, Executions as a Deterrent to
Homicides, 44 PSYCHOL. REP. 562 (1979); David Lester, Deterring Effect of Executions on
Murder as a Function of Number and Proportion of Executions, 45 PSYCHOL. REP. 598 (1979);
Stephen K. Layson, Homicide and Deterrence: A Reexamination of the United States Time-
Series Evidence, 52 S. ECON. J. 68 (1985); James A. Yunker, Testing the Deterrent Effect of
Capital Punishment. A Reduced Form Approach, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 626 (1982); Dale 0.
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It is important to understand, however, that the death penalty is so
rarely imposed that we could hardly expect its effect to show up in
aggregate data, given all the other factors that doubtlessly affect the
murder rate. Arnold Barnett, for example, examined one study that
found no statistically significant deterrent effect: that of Passel. Barnett
found that the model estimated by Passell had a prediction error, in
terms of the number of homicides it predicted in forty-three states in
1960, of 1,635. But there were only forty-four persons executed for
murder in 1960. If each of these executions had deterred five murders,
which would be an excellent "return" in terms of deterrence, the
reduction of 220 murders would not have been discernable, within
accepted standards of statistical reliability, in Passell's data.2'
Given this fact, it is surprising that any studies have found a
statistically significant deterrent effect of execution. But it is not
surprising that one of the studies showing the clearest deterrent effect of
capital punishment, done by Kennedy Wolpin, used data from England
and Wales.21 Wolpin used data spanning the period 1929-1968. During
the early part of this period the probability that a convicted murderer
would be executed was approximately fifty percent. In later years (after
1955) the probability dropped to five percent, and then to zero when the
death penalty was abolished in 1965. Wolpin, in other words, had data
in which the murders deterred by executions were numerous enough to
be visible above the statistical "noise" that pervades all data.
One thing to keep in mind, when considering the evidence on the
possible deterrent effect of executions, is that the evidence that
punishment generally does deter crime generally is overwhelming.
Further, there is strong evidence that more severe punishments deter
better than less severe punishments.' 2 Thus it is reasonable to expect
that the most severe punishment-execution-will deter better than a
Cloninger, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: A Portfolio Approach, 24 APPLIED ECON. 645
(1992); Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and
Death, 65-3 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975); Isaac Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence:
Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL. ECON. 741 (1977); Kenneth I.
Wolpin, Capital Punishment and Homicide in England: A Summary of Results, 68-2 AM. ECON.
REV. 422 (1978).
20. Arnold Barnett, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment. A Test of Some Recent
Studies, 29 OPERATIONS RES. 346 (1981).
21. Wolpin, supra note 19.
22. Ehrlich, supra note 9. See also supra notes 10-11. One good recent study is Harold
J. Brumm & Dale 0. Cloninger, Violent Crime and Punishment An Application of the
LISREL Model, 27 APPLIED ECON. 719 (1995).
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less severe punishment-life imprisonment.' Of course, the logic here
is hardly ironclad. It involves extrapolating from what is known-longer
prison sentences deter better than short ones-to what cannot be known
with much precision-death deters better than a long prison sentence.
Such an extrapolation seems more reasonable to me than the opposite
assumption: that the deterrent effect of severity disappears when we
move beyond long imprisonment to the death penalty.
THE "FUNCTIONAL FORM" OF DETERRENCE
If executions do deter murderers, it is important to consider the
precise nature of the relationship. For example, one possible "functional
form" is a linear one. It is possible that each execution deters a certain
number of murders. Perhaps the first execution in a state deters four
murders, and the second four more, and the hundredth execution four
murders beyond what ninety-nine executions would deter. It is possible
that this is precisely the case. But there are other possibilities.
It is possible, for example, that there is diminishing marginal utility
from executions. Perhaps after executions become somewhat common-
place-commonplace enough that every potential murderer clearly
understands that they might be executed if convicted of murder-further
increases change the perceptions of potential murderers very little, and
thus change the murder rate very little.
On the other hand, perhaps there is some threshold rate of execu-
tions below which murders are simply not deterred. Perhaps people, in
their decision making processes, are oblivious to extremely improbable
contingencies. Thus most readers will have considered the possibility of
dying in a traffic accident, an unlikely but not an absurdly unlikely
possibility, but not the possibility of being hit by a meteorite. If this is
true, executions will have little deterrent effect until the threshold is
exceeded, after which the return will be quite high.
Two things must be said about this "functional form" business. First,
we have no idea what the functional form of any relationship between
executions and murders is. As we have discussed, it is difficult enough
23. This argument ignores the fact that the real alternative to execution seems to be not
life-imprisonment, but rather only a moderately long prison sentence. Death penalty
opponents who wish to weaken the case for capital punishment ought to be aggressively
promoting "life means life" policies, under which murderers who would otherwise be executed
really are imprisoned for life.
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to establish a relationship between murders and executions. The data
available are clearly not good enough to establish what the nature of the
relationship is.
Secondly, the issue has important implications. For example, if
executions have diminishing utility, then the death penalty as it is now
administered, with relatively few executions, may be getting us a fairly
substantial deterrent effect. Following this line of logic, we need not
have radical changes in the way the system operates to justify capital
punishment. We might wish to execute a larger proportion of convicted
murderers for other reasons-because we feel it just or because we do
not wish to pay for their long-term incarceration. But the current system
can be justified on deterrence grounds.
On the other hand, if the deterrent effect of executions increases as
executions increase-with the fiftieth execution having a larger effect
than the first execution-then it is striking that the evidence for a
deterrent effect is as strong as it is. Supporters of capital punishment
should make it a priority not merely to put a law on the books, but to
see that it is actually implemented.
DEATH PENALTY AS THE "BEST BET"
While there are good reasons to believe that the death penalty deters
murders, and some statistical evidence shows that this is true, I would
not claim to know that it is true. More importantly, however, no one
can reasonably claim to know that executions do not deter murders. We
thus find ourselves in a situation that is common in policy analysis: we
have to have some policy, but we are not sure of the costs and benefits
of alternative policies.
In cases such as this, the key issue becomes "what are you willing to
risk?" I am willing to risk executing murderers, even though it might not
deter other murders, while people on the other side are apparently
willing to risk the lives of innocent victims who might be saved if the
death penalty does indeed deter murder. As Ernest Van den Haag put
it:
If we were quite ignorant about the marginal deterrent effects of
execution, we would have to choose-like it or not-between the
certainty of the convicted murderer's death by execution and the
likelihood of the survival of future victims of other murderers on
the one hand, and on the other his certain survival and the
likelihood of the death of new victims. I'd rather execute a man
1996]
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convicted of having murdered others than to put the lives of
innocents at risk. I find it hard to understand the opposite
choice.24
MISTAKES
Opponents of capital punishment claim that innocent people are
executed whenever capital punishment prevails. And of course, if
enough people are executed over a long enough period of time, then yes,
an innocent person will eventually be executed.
It is important to remember, however, that the best evidence shows
that this happens very rarely. Two scholars who strongly oppose the
death penalty (Hugo Adam Bedau and Michael Radelet) have claimed
that of the 7,000 people executed in the United States in this century,
twenty-three were innocent. This certainly seems like a relatively
small number, but Bedau and Radelet cannot produce even this small
number without including a number of questionable cases. The inclusion
of Sacco and Vanzetti among the twenty-three seems more an expression
of ideological orthodoxy than the result of a cool headed assessment of
the evidence. Their claim of innocence for a certain James Adams was
attacked in a Stanford Law Review article for "disregard of the
evidence," and for putting a spin on the evidence that supported their
thesis of Adams' innocence.2 6 There is, the authors concluded, "no
persuasive evidence that any innocent person has been put to death in
more than twenty-five years. 27  In response, Bedau and Radelet
admitted to the Chronicle of Higher Education that (in the words of the
Chronicle's reporter) "some cases require subjective analysis simply
because the evidence is incomplete or tainted." They admitted this was
true of all twenty-three cases that they reported.
Of course, Bedau and Radelet are correct to insist that other cases
of innocent people being executed may well exist, with the historical
record that could prove innocence being long gone or inaccessible. It is
striking, however, that two writers who strongly oppose the death penalty
and have every motivation to report it's miscarriage cannot produce a list
24. ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG & JOHN P. CONRAD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE
69 (1983).
25. RADELET ET AL., supra note 3, at 272-73.
26. Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the
Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 133 (1988).
27. Id. at 150.
28. Peter Monaghan, Scholars' Research on Executions Adds Fuel to Death-Penalty
Debate, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. Jan. 27, 1993, at A8.
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of even twenty-three innocent people who were executed without
including some questionable and controversial cases.
Further, most of the executions on their list were during an era when
the civil liberties protections of the accused were pretty slim compared
to today and when successful prosecution of minority groups was easier
than it is today. The conclusion of all this is that, yes, if a large enough
number of convicted murderers are executed, eventually an innocent
person will be executed. But the best evidence is that this will be
extremely rare.
GOVERNMENT AND THE DEATH OF INNOCENTS
Some, of course, might say that any executions of innocent people are
unacceptable, no matter how few. This argument overlooks the fact that
governments routinely enforce policies that have the foreseeable effect
of taking the lives of some innocent people. When the FDA approves
a new drug, it usually expects at least some deaths due to rare and
infrequent reactions in some patients. And no nation ever makes war
without the sure knowledge that some innocents will be killed. The Gulf
War, for example, met what were, by any historical standard, very
rigorous standards for "discrimination" in the use of force. A very large
proportion of the bombs dropped by American and other allied bombers
fell on military targets, and not on noncombatants.29 Yet Iraqi civilian
casualties have been estimated to be in the range of 5,000-13,000
people. °
Perhaps more poignant is the fact that current allied economic
sanctions against Iraq have caused the deaths of thousands of Iraqis
(including many children) through malnutrition and shortages of medical
supplies. The purpose of these sanctions is to frustrate the ambition of
Saddam Hussein to obtain nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
Now, no one knows for certain that Saddam would be able to produce
such weapons if left entirely alone. And no one can be sure that he
would cause anyone any problems if he did. But the fear'that he might
29. This is not to suggest that the bombing campaign was as antiseptically precise as the
video released by the U.S. military during the war suggested, merely that it was much less
indiscriminate and deadly to noncombatants than in previous wars, and was conducted with
reasonable regard for noncombatants. See RICK ATKINSON, CRUSADE 225-228 (1993).
30. Iraqi Deaths Report Author in Row, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Apr. 16,
1992, at 271.
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is very well-founded. Those who, before they will support the death
penalty, demand certainty that it deters would do well to ponder this
issue.
If one cannot execute murderers because some people convicted of
murder will be found to be innocent, one has to ask how one can
imprison people convicted of various crimes when we can be certain that
some of them will be innocent. The argument of the opponents is that
we can "fix" our mistake by letting someone wrongly imprisoned go free.
They fail to explain how we can give the person back the five, ten, or
twenty years of his life that were taken. They also fail to deal with the
fact that most wrongly imprisoned people actually have only a slim
chance of being vindicated and released. Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam,
at the conclusion of their anti-death penalty volume, discuss cases of
innocent defendants who were not executed.
Often, as we have seen, it was fickle good fortune rather than
anything having to do with the rational workings of the criminal
justice system that played the crucial role in sparing these
innocent defendants. Yet luck was not sufficient to spare them
time in prison (often many years), the agony of uncertainty over
whether they would ever be vindicated or released, and blighted
hopes for a decent life all too frequently destroyed by the ordeal
and stigma of a murder conviction. Low though the odds of
convicting the innocent are, the odds of innocent prisoners-once
convicted-being able to marshal the resources essential to
proving their innocence are lower still.3'
It is striking that these authors do not seem to notice that every single
word in that passage applies with equal force to persons convicted of
murder in states without capital punishment. Merely doing away with the
death penalty does not guarantee that nobody will be unjustly convicted
of murder. It merely guarantees that they cannot be executed. And if
the absence of a death sentence means that juries, judges, governors with
the power of clemency, and political activists will scrutinize the evidence
against an accused murderer less carefully, then our choice may be
between an occasional execution of an innocent person and more
frequent prison sentences imposed upon the innocent.
RACE AND EXECUTION
Anywhere there are Politically Correct people, there is some
rhetorical leverage to be gained by playing the "race card." So it is not
31. RADELET ET AL., supra note 3, at 271-72.
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surprising that opponents of capital punishment talk constantly about the
fact that more blacks, in relation to the size of the black population, are
executed than whites. This supposedly makes the death penalty
illegitimate.
Suppose for a minute that this were true. Note the rather strange
logic involved. It is like discovering that a major corporation is
discriminating against blacks. What do civil rights activists do? Demand
that the corporation stop discriminating? Fix the unfairness? No, they
demand that the corporation stop hiring people! To state the obvious:
racial disparity does not demand an end to hiring. It only demands an
end to discrimination in hiring.
In fact, the evidence of disparity in executions is far different from
what the death penalty opponents say it is. Indeed, the opponents of
capital punishment have both a "mass market" version of the racial
disparity argument and a "specialist" version. The two are flatly
contradictory.
The "mass market" version states that blacks are more likely to be
executed for murder than are whites. And indeed, the number of blacks
on death row is disproportionate relative to the entire American
population. As Frank Chapman put this argument: "For 48 percent of
the death row population in our country to be Black is clearly practicing
genocide when you consider that Afro-Americans are only 12 per cent
of the population.
32
This position implicitly takes the perspective of the convicted
murderer. If a given black is more likely to be executed than a white
who has committed the same crime, that black criminal can reasonably
claim to have been the victim of racial discrimination. If innocent blacks
are convicted and executed more often than innocent whites, we again
have racial discrimination.
At this point, one envisions a nation full of Mark Fuhrmans, all busily
framing innocent black men for murders they did not commit. But then
one notices that black people are far more likely to be victims of murder
than are white people. Add to this the fact that, as James Q. Wilson has
pointed out, the vast majority of murders (over ninety percent) are
intraracial and not interracial, and you have to conclude that there are
more black murderers, per capita.33 Indeed, the disproportionate
number of black executions closely matches the disproportionate number
32. Political Affairs, July 1987 (copy on file with author).
33. WILSON, supra note 12, at 192-93.
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of black murder victims. For example, in 1980 forty-two percent of the
victims of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter were black. That
number has steadily increased so that in 1993, fifty-one percent of all
murder victims were black.' Data show the average black to be more
than seven times as likely to be victimized by a murder or nonnegligent
manslaughter than a white. In 1993, 40.8% of all prisoners under a
sentence of death were black.35 Between 1980 and 1991, 133 whites and
88 blacks were executed in the United States.36 In other words, about
39.8% of the prisoners executed were black. The conclusion is clear: if
proportionately more blacks are executed than whites, it is because more
blacks commit murder.
People pushing the notion of racial disparity will note that blacks who
kill whites are more likely to receive the death penalty than blacks who
kill other blacks. The unfortunate problem with such comparisons is that
people who kill others of their own race are very likely to know the
person they killed. People who kill people of another race are mostly
killing strangers. The two sorts of murders are, in short, very different
and not comparable.
What happens when we look at the types of murders that are far and
away the most common: whites killing whites, and blacks killing blacks.
Whites who kill whites are more likely to be executed than blacks who kill
blacks.
Sheldon Ekland-Olson, for example, examined data from cases in
Texas brought between 1974 and 1983. Ekland-Olson was thus
examining the way the system operated after the reforms of the
sentencing process mandated by the Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia37 and related cases. The choice of Texas was significant, since
the death penalty statute in Texas allowed less discretion than statutes
in other states such as Florida and Georgia.38
Ekland-Olson showed, first, that the death row population overrep-
resented offenders who killed strangers and underrepresented offenders
who killed acquaintances, a fact that makes clear the uselessness of
comparing interracial murders and intraracial murders. Secondly, he
showed that offenders who had killed a white were overrepresented, and
34. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 339.
35. Id. at 587.
36. Id. at 598.
37. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
38. Sheldon Ekland-Olson, Structured Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty: The
First Decade after Furman in Texas, 69 Soc. Sci. Q. 853 (1988). It is important to note that
Ekland-Olson studied death sentences, rather than actual executions.
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those that killed a black or an Hispanic were underrepresented on death
row. Finally, as we would expect understanding that the vast majority
of murders are intraracial, whites were overrepresented on death row.39
Paternoster, using data from South Carolina on the probability that
prosecutors will seek the death penalty in a homicide case, likewise found
that cases where whites killed whites were much more likely to result in
a death penalty request than cases of a black killing a black.'
William J. Bowers found that blacks who killed whites, and whites
who killed whites were substantially more likely to be indicted for first
degree murder, and substantially more likely to be convicted for first
degree murder than blacks who killed blacks.4' The data tended to
show that blacks who killed whites and whites who killed whites were
more likely to be sentenced to death, but Bowers could not establish this
with the degree of statistical confidence that applied to the other two
findings.42 This study is interesting in that the evidence for racial
disparity in indictment and conviction is better than the evidence for
disparity in sentencing. But of course, it is only the latter that is
addressed by the abolition of the death penalty.
Gary Kleck looked at the imposition of death sentences during the
years 1967-1978, and at actual executions during the period 1930-1967.
He found that, outside the South, black homicide offenders have been
less likely than white offenders to be sentenced to death or executed. In
regard to the South, a pattern of apparent discrimination against black
offenders in the early data disappeared in more recent data. Between
1950 and 1967, black offenders and white offenders seemed to be
executed at identical rates in the South.43
39. Id. at 861.
40. Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek
the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983). Consistent with
other studies, blacks who killed whites were much more likely to result in a request for the
death penalty than whites who kill blacks. But the latter case prevailed in only 3.2% of all
homicides in the sample, while in 8.8% of the homicides blacks had killed whites. Id. at 767.
The rarity of whites killing blacks suggests this category of murder is not comparable to other
categories in the data.
41. Not only does the rarity of whites killing blacks make it questionable that those
murders are comparable to other murders, it also renders it extremely difficult to make
statistical generalizations about whites who kill blacks. In one often cited study by Baldus,
only 64 homicide cases out of roughly 2,500 studies involved killings of black victims by white
defendants. Statistics based on small numbers of cases are unreliable.
42. William J. Bowers, The Pervasiveness ofArbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-
Furman Capital Statutes, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067 (1983).
43. Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of
the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. SOc. REV. 783 (1981).
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This brings us to the "specialist" version of the racial disparity
argument: that the criminal justice system discriminates against blacks by
its lack of concern for black victims. As Anthony Amsterdam has
claimed:
Although less than 40 percent of Georgia homicide cases involve
white victims, in 87 percent of the cases in which a death sentence
is imposed, the victim is white. White-victim cases are almost
eleven times more likely to produce a death sentence than are
black-victim cases.4
And Randall L. Kennedy, describing the same Baldus study, lamented
what he described as the fact that "in Georgia's marketplace of emotion
the lives of blacks simply count for less that the lives of whites. 45
This writer thinks it exceedingly tacky that the opponents of capital
punishment, who first adopted an offender-centered concept of justice
(when it was convenient to argue that too many blacks are being
executed), simply turned on a dime and adopted a victim-centered
concept of justice (when the data showed that too many whites are being
executed). Whatever premise is convenient, one supposes. Even worse
is their tendency to adopt vague rhetoric about the evil of racism in an
attempt to cover up the fact that they have turned on a dime. And it is
a bit aggravating to find articles from authors who clearly have data that
might show discrimination based on the race of the. offender, but who do
not present it and choose to discuss the race of the victim instead. One
can only conclude that the data on the race of the offender do not show
what they wanted it to show. 46
However, the "specialist" view of the situation appears to be correct.
Although we have to be very careful about assuming that white on white
murders are empirically equivalent to black on black murders, the data
do suggest that the criminal justice system undervalues the lives of black
victims. Baldus and his colleagues, for example, used extensive controls
for the nature of the murder and the number of aggravating factors
present, and still found murderers of white victims to be slightly more
likely to be sentenced to death.47  But the opponents of the death
penalty suggest that we should value the lives of black victims even less
44. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Race and the Death Penalty, 7 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 2, 84
(1988).
45. Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988).
46. David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study
of the Georgia Experience, 74 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 709 n.131 (1983).
47. Id. at 708.
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by executing no murderers of black people. Then to assume racial
justice, affirmative action quota style, we should execute no murderers
of white victims either!
While we seek to remedy inequities in the American criminal justice
system, we would do well to remember the words of Ernest Van den
Haag:
Guilt is individual. If guilty whites or wealthy people escape the
gallows and guilty poor people do not, the poor or black do not
become less guilty because the others escaped their deserved
punishment. Whether due to willful discrimination, capricious-
ness, or unavoidable accidental circumstances, some people will
always get away with murder. Is that a reason to deny the justice
of the punishment of those guilty persons who did not get away?
Their guilt is not diminished by the escape of the others, nor do
they deserve less punishment because others did not get the
punishment they deserve. Justice involves punishment according
to what is deserved by the crime and the guilt of the criminal -
regardless of whether others guilty of the same crime escape.4'
The opponents of capital punishment are pushing an argument they
would never use in other contexts. The fact that you parked illegally and
did not get a ticket does not relieve me of paying the fine when I do get
a parking ticket. The fact that you bamboozled the I.R.S. does not make
it acceptable for me to cheat on my taxes.
BLACK PUBLIC OPINION
Contrary to what the Politically Correct people would have you
believe, polls show a clear majority of black people favoring capital
punishment. The most recent Gallup Poll, for example, found fifty-nine
percent of blacks nationwide favoring the death penalty, and only thirty-
one percent opposed.49 Linda Lichter commissioned a nationwide poll
of blacks that contained 600 respondents, more than in any poll that fails
to oversample blacks. Among those respondents with an opinion, fifty-
five percent favored the death penalty, and forty-five percent opposed."
48. Ernest Van den Haag, "Murderers Deserve the Death Penalty." The World & I,
November 1989 (copy on file with author).
49. Gallup & Newport, supra note 1, at 43. This was in spite of seventy-three percent
of black respondents agreeing that "A black person is more likely than a white person to
receive the death penalty for the same crime." Id. at 45. This shows the success of the "mass
market" view of racial disparity discussed above.
50. Linda S. Lichter, Who Speaks for Black America?, 84 PUB. OPIN. 43 (Aug./Sept.
1985).
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Even sixty percent of the upscale readers of Ebony said capital
punishment is "the only just punishment" for murder."
Now of course, a majority of black Americans can just as easily be
in the wrong as a majority of white Americans. These data do show,
however, the hollowness of the claim of the anti-death penalty forces to
speak for black Americans. In this, as in many other matters, the white
liberals and leftists who claim to speak for black people are actually
speaking mostly for themselves.
JUSTICE
Finally, we come to the most important consideration. Most
Americans feel that the most heinous crimes require that, as a matter of
justice, the criminal be executed. They have on their side philosophers
like John Stuart Mill, who concluded:
When there has been brought home to any one, by conclusive
evidence, the greatest crime known to the law; and when the
attendant circumstances suggest no palliation of the guilt, no hope
that the culprit may even yet not be unworthy to live among
mankind, nothing to make it probable that the crime was an
exception to his general character rather than a consequence of
it, then I confess it appears to me that to deprive the criminal of
the life of which he has proved himself to be unworthy -
solemnly to blot him out from the fellowship of mankind and
from the catalogue of the living - is the most appropriate, as it
is certainly the most impressive, mode in which society can attach
to so great a crime the penal consequences which for the security
of life it is indispensable to annex to it.5"
Likewise Kant, in The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, asserted:
"Anyone who is a murderer-that is, has committed a murder, com-
manded one, or taken part in one-must suffer death."53
This, of course, is the same injunction as that of the Mosaic Law, "an
eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." Opponents of the death penalty
ridicule this principle as "cruel" and "barbaric" and characterize the
application of it as "revenge." Such statements are usually nothing more
than an expression of cultural prejudices. Singularly lacking in the anti-
51. Ebony's Annual Readers Poll, EBONY, Sept. 1994, at 43. This was far from being a
scientific poll, but is interesting both for the large number of respondents (9,657) and for the
relatively affluent nature of the respondents.
52. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, London: Apr. 21, 1868.
53. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 104 (Macmillan
Publishing Co. 1985) (1797).
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death penalty literature is a coherent argument supporting these
assertions. For example, the death penalty is no doubt "cruel," but then
imprisoning people is "cruel." The Founders prohibition on "cruel and
unusual" punishments recognized this. They did not intend to prohibit
cruelty imposed on criminals. They intended to forbid innovative forms
of cruelty.
The claim that the death penalty is "barbaric" is equally unsupported
by any rational argument. I suppose the assumption is that between the
Visigoths (who were barbarians) and the Romans (who were civilized)
the Romans must have always been in the right, and the Visigoths in the
wrong. This argument does not get one very far, however, since both the
Romans and the Visigoths had capital punishment.
As for the "barbarity" of the "eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth"
principle: apparently the argument here is that Moses came down from
Mt. Sinai a very long time ago. Since we want everything to be up to
date here in Kansas City, we could not possibly endorse a principle from
the distant past.
To state the obvious: it is perfectly possible that there are some
timeless ethical principles, and perfectly possible that the Law of Moses
embodied these. This should seem obvious to Christians and Jews.
Even atheists cannot rule out, a priori, this possibility.
In fact, virtually everyone believes that the state should impose evil
on people who themselves do terribly evil things. In other words,
virtually everyone believes in retribution, which death penalty opponents
call "vengeance" when it results in execution of murderers (but not when
it results in the incarceration of people who commit rape, mayhem, or
tax fraud).
For example, essentially no one believes that a teenager who steals
a car and takes a joyride should be punished as severely as a rapist.
Conversely, no one believes that a rapist should be treated as leniently
as a teenager who takes a joyride in a stolen car. And no one doubts
that a man who both rapes and murders a woman should receive a more
severe sentence than a man who "merely" raped a woman.' As The'
Committee for the Study of Incarceration put it:
If one asks how severely a wrongdoer deserves to be punished, a
familiar principle comes to mind: Severity of punishment should
54. I am of course being a bit mischievous using rape as an example, since it is a "crime
against women," and thus politically correct people believe it should be severely punished.
This is an example of a bad motivation (political correctness) leading people to a sound
conclusion (that rapists should be severely punished).
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be commensurate with the seriousness of the wrong. Only grave
wrongs merit severe penalties; minor misdeeds deserve lenient
punishments. Disproportionate penalties are undeserved-severe
sanctions for minor wrongs or vice versa. This principle has
variously been called a principle of "proportionality" or "just
desserts": we prefer to call it commensurate desserts .... 55
Of course, the principle of commensurate desserts leaves open the
issue of what punishments are "commensurate." One can accept the
principle of "proportionality" and oppose the death penalty for any of
a variety of reasons. The point, however, is that the opponents of capital
punishment have no business claiming that retribution as a basis for the
criminal justice system is "cruel" or "barbaric" when the issue is capital
punishment, while fully accepting the principle in other contexts. They
are obligated to make an argument specifically about the death penalty.
The opponents of the death penalty have great difficulty doing so.
For example, it is often argued that, when we impose the death penalty,
we cheapen the value attached to human life. Further, it is argued that
the state is teaching people that killing is acceptable. These arguments
were made in the last century and provoked John Stuart Mill to respond:
I am surprised at the employment of this argument, for it is one
which might be brought against any punishment whatever. It is
not human life only, not human life as such, that ought to be
sacred to us, but human feelings. The human capacity of
suffering is what we should cause to be respected, not the mere
capacity of existing. And we may imagine somebody asking how
we can teach people not to inflict suffering by ourselves inflicting
it? But to this I should answer - all of us would answer - that
to deter by suffering from inflicting suffering is not only possible,
but the very purpose of penal justice. Does fining a criminal
show want of respect for property, or imprisoning him, for
personal freedom? Just as unreasonable is it to think that to take
the life of a man who has taken that of another is to show want
of regard for human life. We show, on the contrary, most
emphatically our regard of it, by the adoption of a rule that he
who violates that right in another forfeits it for himselft and that
while no other crime that he can commit deprives him of his right
to live, this shall.56
55. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 66 (1976)
56. Hansard's Parliamentary Debate, 3rd Series, London: Apr. 21, 1868.
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Is DEATH DIFFERENT?
Opponents of the death penalty are thus constantly making argu-
ments against the death penalty that they logically should be using
against other forms of punishment, but will not. They argue that racial
disparity renders the death penalty unacceptable, but not that racial
disparity prevents us from imprisoning robbers. They argue that
executing murderers demeans human life, but not that imprisoning
kidnappers demeans human liberty. They argue that the possibility of
mistakes precludes our executing murderers, but not that it precludes our
imprisoning them for life. They attack the notion of retribution as
"primitive vengeance" when the death penalty is proposed, but insist that
the whole criminal justice system be based on the notion of proportion-
ate desserts. This results in long prison sentences for some offenders.
What the opponents of the death penalty need to do is to argue that
execution is fundamentally different from imprisonment. Of course,
execution is "different." The question is: is it different in a way that
renders the arguments for imprisonment (which virtually everyone agrees
to be compelling) invalid as arguments for execution? Put differently,
is the death penalty like other sanctions, merely more severe, or is there
a fundamental incommensurability between execution and even the
longest prison sentence?
Readers might ask themselves a series of questions in contemplating
this issue. First, "suppose I had the choice between a system of criminal
justice where I, even if I were totally innocent, had a one in a million
chance (during my entire lifetime) of being arrested, convicted, and
executed for murder, or (on the other hand) a system where I had a one
in a million chance of being arrested, convicted, and imprisoned for life
for murder."
Although vastly inhumane prison conditions might cause us to prefer
the former, for most of us this is an easy call: we would prefer to live.
Now, suppose the choice was between a one in a million chance of
being unjustly executed, and a one in 500,000 chance of being unjustly
imprisoned for life? This choice is a bit tougher, is it not? Suppose the
choice is between a one in 10,000 chance of being unjustly imprisoned
for life, and a one in a million chance of being unjustly executed? Most
of us, I suspect, would accept the risk of execution.
Alternatively, ask yourself this: would I prefer a criminal justice
system that would impose upon me a one in a million chance of being
unjustly executed for a murder I did not commit, or a one in a million
chance of being the victim of murder? Given the horror of being tried
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and convicted and awaiting execution on death row, we might prefer a
one in a million chance of being shot in, say, a drive-by shooting.
Now, suppose the choice is a one in a million chance of being
unjustly executed, or a one in 10,000 chance of being murdered? I
would easily opt for the less risky of the two alternatives.
Death penalty opponents might reply that I have not proven that any
such choice prevails. I have merely assumed that, if capital punishment
is instituted a deterrent effect will deter 100 times as many murders as
innocent people will be executed.
But in fact I am making probabilistic arguments. For my argument
to be valid, it is not necessary that executions be proven to deter
murders, just that there be a discrete probability that they do so. If there
is a probability of .5 that the studies showing a deterrent effect are
correct, and a .5 probability that they are not, then the prudent course
of action is to attempt to deter murders with executions. Put another
way, the burden is really on the opponents of the death penalty to
establish that it has no deterrent effect. Until they do so, the prudent
choice is to execute murderers.
Now the reader may notice that I have not dealt with the issue of
executing guilty murderers, but rather with the issue of executing an
occasional innocent person. I have chosen to make the more difficult
argument, rather than a very easy one. If the average citizen is willing
to bear a very slight but very real possibility of being unjustly convicted
and executed for murder, in return for a possible deterrent effect and for
the sense that justice is being done, then it makes no sense to quibble
about the execution of the guilty.
In sum, it is difficult to argue that to execute someone is uniquely
unacceptable, among the range of possible punishments. Execution is
the most severe punishment we have-clearly more severe than life
imprisonment. This severity holds out the promise of a greater deterrent
effect, makes the punishment appropriate for the most heinous crimes,
and makes a miscarriage of justice a greater evil than would be the case
with other punishments. But it does not make the death penalty
somehow uniquely unacceptable.
DEATH AND HUMAN DIGNITY
The opponents have on their side not justice but sociology. They are
constantly claiming that murderers are the product of unfortunate
surroundings-maybe poor, maybe the victims of racial discrimination,
perhaps abused as children-and really cannot be held responsible for
what they do. Again, it is hard to see why one should make arguments
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like this when execution is the issue, and not argue against imprisonment
in the same way. If having an unfortunate life means one should not be
executed, does it not also mean one should not be imprisoned?
Additionally, if one wants to exempt people from punishment
because they have been victims of an unfortunate situation, it is very
difficult to see how one can confine the exemption to politically correct
"victim" groups. If a young ghetto black teenager who kills someone is
to be excused as a "victim of society," is not a member of the Ku Klux
Klan who kills a black person equally the product of society? His racist
attitudes must either be the product of his environment or of his
heredity. Since he has even less control over his heredity than over his
environment, it is difficult to see how we can fail to excuse him once we
start excusing people on the grounds that society really is at fault.
Not all disadvantage, remember, is material. Young people growing
up in very comfortable situations can be the victims of moral deprivation,
perhaps because of their parents' unwillingness or inability to provide
moral training, or of unfortunate peer-group influences.
In sum, once we start blaming society for the evil actions of
individuals, it is hard to see how we can limit this to murderers for whom
solicitude is politically correct. How can we, with any intellectual
integrity at all, excuse the woman who kills her abusive husband, and not
the enraged husband who kills his unfaithful wife? How can we excuse
the poor black teenager who kills a convenience store clerk in a robbery,
and not excuse the white teenager from an affluent home who does
exactly the same thing?
But there is a more fundamental problem with excusing murderers
on account of their unfortunate background. It demeans them by treating
them as less than fully responsible human beings who make choices and
have to live with the consequences of their choices. It also demeans the
achievement of people who faced the same misfortunes, but did not turn
into murderers. The opponents of capital punishment are convinced that
they are free people who make moral choices and are responsible for the
choices they make. They ought to accord the same basic human dignity
to people who make evil choices.
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